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Public Good Economics and Standard Essential Patents
Christopher S. Yoo
ABSTRACT
Standard essential patents have emerged as a major focus in both the
public policy and academic arenas. The primary concern is that once a patented
technology has been incorporated into a standard, the standard can effectively
insulate it from competition from substitute technologies. To guard against the
appropriation of quasi-rents that are the product of the standard setting process
rather than the innovation itself, standard setting organizations (SSOs) require
patentholders to disclose their relevant intellectual property before the standard
has been adopted and to commit to license those rights on terms that are fair,
reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND).
To date courts and commentators have provided relatively little guidance
as to the meaning of FRAND. The most common approach is to impose a
uniform royalty based on a percentage over overall revenue. The baseline for
setting this uniform royalty is the royalty that the patentholder could have charged
had the standard had not been created. In essence, this approach takes the ex ante
distribution of entitlements as given and attempts to ensure that the standard
setting process does not increase patentholders’ bargaining power. However,
comparisons to the ex ante baseline do not provide a basis for assessing whether
the resulting outcome would maximize economic welfare.
Fortunately, public goods economics can provide an analytical framework
for assessing whether a particular licensing structure is likely to maximize
economic welfare. Although it is often observed that patentable inventions are
public goods, key concepts of public good economics (such as the Samuelson
condition that provides public good economics’ key optimality criterion) are
rarely explored in any depth.
A close examination of public good economics reveals that it has
important implications standard essential patents and FRAND. The resulting
framework surpasses the current approach by providing a basis for assessing
whether any particular outcome is likely to maximize welfare instead of simply
taking the existing distribution of entitlements as given and allocating them in the
most efficient way.
In addition, the insight that demand-side price discrimination is a
necessary precondition to efficient market provision suggests that economic
welfare would be maximized if holders of standard essential patents were
permitted to charge nonuniform royalty rates. At the same time, the optimal level
of price discrimination would allow consumers to retain some of the surplus. It
also underscores that the fundamental problem posed by standard essential patents
may be strategic behavior and incentive incompatibility. The literature also
suggests several alternative institutional structures that can help mitigate some of
these concerns.
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INTRODUCTION
In the modern economy, innovation has emerged as a key driver of economic growth,1
demonstrated eloquently by the increase in the number of patent applications and grant over the
past two decades.2 Under U.S. law, inventors who create innovations that satisfy the
requirements of patentability are given the exclusive right to practice their invention as a reward
for their innovative activity. To the extent that inventions represent an advance over the prior
state of the art, the amount that a patentholder will be able to charge is the difference between the
value of their inventions and the value of the next-best technological alternative.

*

John H. Chestnut Professor of Law, Communication, and Computer & Information Science and Founding
Director of the Center for Technology, Innovation and Competition, University of Pennsylvania.
1
For a classic statement of this position, see JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND
DEMOCRACY 84–85 (3d ed. 1950).
2
Patent Technology Monitoring Team, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, U.S. Patent Statistics Chart,
Calendar Years 1963–2012 (June 7, 2013 5:59:37 PM),
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm.
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Many modern products depend on multiple innovations. When that is the case,
consumers and producers often benefit from the creation of an industry standard. Industry-wide
adoption of a single standard can reduce costs and reduce uncertainty for firms wishing to
produce components of the standard.3 Standards also provide flexibility for consumers to mix
and match different components and can speed innovation by allowing parallel testing of
different technological configurations consistent with the standard.4 The problem is that once a
patented technology has been incorporated into a standard, the standard insulates it from
competition from substitute technologies. In the process, the incorporation of a patent into a
standard can create quasi-rents that are the product of the standard-setting process rather than the
innovation itself. The reduction of competition can permit the holder of a patent that has been
incorporated into a standard to appropriate more than the incremental value created by their
innovation. Instead, patentholders may attempt to appropriate surplus created by other
innovations or factors of production in addition to the value created by their innovation.
To prevent this type of opportunistic behavior, standard setting organizations (SSOs)
require patentholders to disclose their relevant intellectual property before the standard has been
adopted and to commit to license those rights on terms that are fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND). Unfortunately, as two noted commentators observed, “there are no
generally agreed tests to determine whether a particular license does or does not satisfy a RAND
commitment.”5 SSOs have yet to provide much guidance as to what FRAND means,6 and to
date, only a single trial court has offered a complete articulation of FRAND in a particular case.7
3

U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 33 (2007), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/hearings/ip/222655.pdf.
4
Christopher S. Yoo, Modularity Theory and Internet Policy (forthcoming 2014), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2032221.
5
Daniel G. Swanson & William J. Baumol, Reasonable and Nondiscriminatory (RAND) Royalties,
Standards Selection, and Control of Market Power, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 5 (2005).
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The academic writing on the subject has attempted to implement FRAND to mimic the
royalty that the patentholder could have charged had the standard had not been created.8 In
essence, the objective is to design FRAND to preserve ex ante bargaining power that would have
existed in the absence of the standard while preventing the patentholder from exercising any ex
post bargaining power created by the standard. In particular, some commentators have
concluded that replicating the outcomes of the bilateral negotiations that would have occurred
naturally suggests that patentholders should be permitted to charge licensees different amounts
based on differences in bargaining power and differences in the incremental value they derive
from the patented invention.9
Unfortunately, this approach simply assumes that the existing level of patent protection is
economically optimal without analyzing whether the alternative institutional form embodied by
the standard may affect the analysis. As such, this approach does not provide any basis for
assessing whether particular royalty structures would maximize economic welfare. Instead, it
takes the ex ante distribution of entitlements as the relevant baseline from the standpoint of
economic welfare and innovation and seeks to implement FRAND in a manner that replicates the
value of those entitlements.
Fortunately, public goods theory can provide an analytical framework for assessing
whether permitting patent holders to charge higher licensing fees to those who value the patent

Dennis W. Carlton & Allan L. Shampine, An Economic Interpretation of FRAND, 9 J. COMPETITION L. &
ECON. 531, 532 (2013).
7
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., Case No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25,
2013).
8
See, e.g., Carlton & Shampine, supra note 8, at 536–37, 539–40, 541–42, 545–46; Richard J. Gilbert, Deal
or No Deal? Licensing Negotiations in Standard-Setting Organizations, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 855, 860 (2011);
Swanson & Baumol, supra note 5, at 10.
9
Carlton & Shampine, supra note 8, at 540–41; Mario Mariniello, Fair, Reasonable and NonDiscriminatory (FRAND) Terms: A Challenge for Competition Authorities, 71 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 523,
525, 532 (2011).
6
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more is likely to be efficient.10 Although it is a commonplace to observe that patentable
inventions and similar types of information are public goods,11 the nuances of public good
economics are rarely explored in the literature.12 This Essay will examine the implications of
public good economics for FRAND licensing, paying particular attention to whether permitting
differential pricing based on value to individual licensees is likely to be efficient.
I.

PUBLIC GOOD ECONOMICS

Public goods are traditionally regarded as having two defining characteristics. First, they
are nonexcludable, in that firms cannot provide them to one consumer without simultaneously
providing them to others as well. Second, they are nonrival, in that the consumption by one
person does not reduce the supply available for others.13 Like all forms of information,
patentable inventions appear to satisfy both criteria. In the absence of patent protection,
inventors who reveal their innovations to others have no viable means for preventing them from
being shared with third parties. Moreover, the fact that a patent is shared with one person does
not in any way diminish the inventor’s ability to share it with any number of other people.
Unfortunately, these assumptions have not been operationalized in the patent literature in
a manner that takes into account the full insight of public good economics. For example, the

10

For overviews of the literature on public goods, see RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF
EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS (2d ed. 1996); and William H. Oakland, Theory of Public
Goods, in 2 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 485 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 1987).
11
For the seminal statement, see Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for
Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 614–16
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research ed., 1962), available at www.nber.org/chapters/c2144.pdf.
12
For my initial exploration of public good economics and an application to copyright, see Christopher S.
Yoo, Copyright and Public Good Economics: A Misunderstood Relation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 635 (2007).
13
For the seminal statement, see R.A. Musgrave, Provision for Social Goods, in PUBLIC ECONOMICS: AN
ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION AND THEIR RELATIONS TO THE PRIVATE SECTORS 124, 126–
29 (Julius Margolis & Henri Guitton eds., 1969).
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patent literature models nonrivalry most often with the assumption that marginal cost is zero.14
While the marginal cost pricing problems are real,15 Samuelson specifically noted in one of his
early follow-on papers to his seminal analysis that the provision of public goods would continue
to be problematic even if the marginal cost pricing problem were solved.16
Simply put, the central feature of public goods is not jointness in production, but rather
jointness in consumption. Stated somewhat more formally, nonrivalry allows the same quantity
to serve as an argument in both multiple people’s consumption functions.17 Moreover, although
producers can adjust the size of a public good by investing more or less to produce it, once the
public good has been produced, every consumer consumes a good of the same magnitude.
Consider, for example, a fireworks display. One can use more or fewer rockets, but whatever the
size of the display, everyone gets the same thing.18 The same is true of patentable inventions.
Inventors can spend more or less in developing their inventions, but once the invention has been
created, every licensee receives the same technology. It is for this reason, the benefits of public
goods like information are often said to be indivisible.19 Consumers either purchase them or they
do not, and all those who purchase them receive precisely the same good.

See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Intellectual Property and the Organization of Information Production, 22 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 81, 82 (2002); Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and How to Get Beyond Intellectual
Property Internalism, 59 UCLA L. REV. 970, 974 (2012); F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for
Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 727 (2001); Peter Lee, Toward a Distributive Commons in
Patent Law, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 917, 929; Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83
TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1050–54 (2005); Janusz A. Ordover, Economic Foundations and Considerations in Protecting
Industrial and Intellectual Property, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 503 (1984); Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as
Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1744 (2007).
15
For the classic analysis, see Harold Hotelling, The General Welfare in Relation to Problems of Taxation
and of Railway and Utility Rates, 6 ECONOMETRICA 242 (1938). For a modern application to patent, see John F.
Duffy, The Marginal Cost Controversy in Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 37 (2004).
16
Paul A. Samuelson, Aspects of Public Expenditure Theories, 40 REV. ECON. & STAT. 332, 336 (1958).
17
Id. at 334 (noting that public goods “simultaneously enter into many persons’ indifference curves”).
18
See HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 58–63 (7th ed. 2005).
19
See, e.g., Arrow, supra note 11, at 615–16, 619, 623. Indeed, a leading book-length analysis of public good
economics regards the terms “nonrivalry of consumption” and “indivisibility of benefits” as synonymous. CORNES
& SANDLER, supra note 10, at 8.
14
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Indivisibility of benefits gives rise to the equilibrium characteristics that make public
good economics distinctive. Although the economic analysis of public goods has become
increasingly formal, the basic intuitions can be easily illustrated by comparing the baseline case
of a two-person economy for private goods with the case of a two-person economy of public
goods.
A.

Private Goods
Assume that the society is populated by two people, Alison and Brendan, who each have

a demand for apples and oranges.20 Apples and oranges are excludable, as it is possible to give
the benefit to Alison without conveying to Brendan at the same time. Apples and oranges are
also rival, in that Alison’s consumption of the fruit reduces the supply available for consumption
by Brendan and vice versa. Both fruits are also divisible, in that Alison does not necessarily
have to consume the same quantity of apples or oranges as Brendan.
Alison’s and Brendan’s demand curves for apples are depicted in Figure 1. The
horizontal axis measures the number of apples (a), and the vertical axis measures the price of
apples (Pa). Alison’s demand curve is denoted by DaA , while Brendan’s demand curve is
denoted by DaB . The market demand curve for apples ( DaA+ B ) can be determined simply by
adding together the quantity of apples that Alison and Brendan would demand at any particular
price. The market demand curve is thus the horizontal summation of each consumer’s individual
demand curves. Superimposing a market supply curve (Sa) on the market demand curve allows
us to identify the resulting equilibrium. At this point, Alison consumes a*A and Brendan
consumes a*B , and both pay an equilibrium price of Pa*. Note that Alison and Brendan do not
20

This discussion that follows is adapted from HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 58–63 (7th ed. 2005).
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necessarily consume the same amounts. In short, both Alison and Brendan pay the same price
and reveal the intensity of their respective preferences by consuming different quantities.
Figure 1: Aggregation of Demand for Private Goods (Horizontal Summation)

Pa

Pa

Pa
Sa

Pa *

Pa *

a*A

DaA
a

Pa *

a*B

DaB
a

a*A + a*B

DaA+ B
a

Source: Rosen, supra note 20, at 59 fig.4.2.
B.

Public Goods
The process of deriving the market demand curve and the resulting equilibria are

strikingly different for public goods, such as a patentable invention, i. Alison’s and Brendan’s
demands for i are represented by DiA and DiB respectively, with the horizontal axis depicting the
number of resources used to produce i. Because every person simultaneously consumes exactly
the same amount of i, the market demand curve ( DiA+ B ) is the sum of the prices that each
consumer would be willing to pay for any particular quantity of i ( Pi A + Pi B ). In contrast to
private goods, where the market demand curve is the horizontal summation of the individual
demand curves, for public goods, the market demand curve is the vertical summation of the
individual demand curves.21

See Paul A. Samuelson, Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditure, 37 REV. ECON. &
STAT. 350, 353–54 (1955) (“[W]e must in the case of public goods add different individuals’ curves vertically.”).
21
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Figure 2: Aggregation of Demand for Public Goods (Vertical Summation)
Pi

Pi*A

Pi

i*

DiA
i

Pi*B

Pi

DiB

i*

i
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Pi*A + Pi*B

DiA + DiB
i*

i

Source: Rosen, supra note 20, at 62 fig.4.4.
Superimposing a supply curve (Si) leads to an equilibrium price of Pi*A + Pi*B and an
equilibrium quantity of i*, where Alison’s willingness to pay is Pi*A , while Brendan’s willingness
to pay is Pi*B . Again, Alison and Brendan may place a different value on the good. Because all
consumers necessarily consume the same quantity, variations in the intensity can only be
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reflected by differences in their reservation prices. Thus, in contrast to private goods, where
consumers pay the same price and signal the intensity of their preferences by consuming

different quantities, for public goods, individuals consume the same quantity and signal the
intensity of their preferences by paying different prices.
II.

IMPLICATIONS

The fact that public goods require the vertical summation of demand has several
important policy implications. As an initial matter, it explains why markets tend to
systematically underproduce public goods. More importantly for the purposes of this Article, it
underscores that side price discrimination based on differences in value is a necessary condition
for the efficient production of public goods. At the same time, it shows that price discrimination
need not be perfect in the sense that all of the surplus need not be transferred to the producer.
A.

Systematic Underproduction of Public Goods
The vertical summation of the demand curves leads to systematic underproduction of

public goods. Again, the reasons are well illustrated by comparing an economy consisting of
two private goods with an economy consisting of a public good and a private good.
1.

Private Goods

In an economy consisting of two private goods, scarcity of resources dictates that society
can only produce a limited amount of fruit at any time. The maximum feasible levels of
production of both products are represented by the production possibility frontier, which because
of the principle of diminishing marginal returns is concave to the origin. The marginal rate of
transformation of apples or oranges (MRTao) is equal to the slope of the production possibility
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frontier at any particular point. At the same time, producers are willing to forego revenue from
one product if they are able to recoup those losses through additional sales of the other product.
This tradeoff permits the generation of isoprofit curves along which producers are indifferent,
with curves located farther from the origin representing higher levels of profit. The slope of the
isoprofit curves is necessarily –Pa /Po. If MRTao > –Pa /Po, then producers could increase their
profits by decreasing their production of apples and increasing their production of oranges until

MRTao = –Pa /Po.
Figure 3: Production in an Economy of Two Private Goods

a

isoprofit curves
(slope = –Pa /Po)

production possibility
frontier

o
Source: Rosen, supra note 20, at _.
On the demand side, both Alison and Brendan can tradeoff between purchases of apples
and oranges subject to a budget constraint, represented by the straight line with slope –Pa /Po
depicted in Figure 4. In addition, both Alison’s and Brendan’s preferences for the tradeoff
between apples and oranges are represented by a series of indifference curves, which are convex
to the origin because of the principle of diminishing marginal returns. The indifference curves
located farther from the origin represent higher levels of utility. The consumer’s marginal rate of
substitution of apples for oranges (MRSao) is represented by the slope along the indifference
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curve. Consumers have the incentive to achieve the highest level of utility permitted by their
budget constraint. If MRSao > –Pa /Po, then Alison could increase her utility by increasing her
consumption of apples and decreasing his consumption of oranges until MRSao = –Pa /Po, at
which point the indifference curve will be tangent to the budget line. This analysis can be
applied both to Alison ( MRS aoA ) and Brendan ( MRS aoB ).
Figure 4: Consumption in an Economy of Two Private Goods

a

indifference curves

budget line
(slope = –Pa /Po)

o
Source: Rosen, supra note 20, at 556 fig.A.14.
Markets for private goods thus reach equilibrium where
MRS aoA = MRS aoB = − Pa / Po = MRTao . At this point, every consumer receives the highest feasible

level of utility, and society maximizes output given the current level of resources, which
maximizes economic welfare. Note that neither consumers nor producers can improve their
position by changing their activity levels. Consequently, the resulting equilibrium is Pareto
optimal. More importantly for our purposes, neither Alison nor Brendan has any incentive to
misrepresent the value each places on apples or oranges. Because prices are uniform and set by
the market, the only way they can alter their behavior is by changing their levels of consumption
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for each fruit. However, purchasing more or less of either fruit would only cause their utility to
decrease. They thus have no incentive not to reveal the intensity of their preferences truthfully.
2.

Public Goods

The situation is quite different for public goods. The fact that every person
simultaneously consumes the entirety of the public good means that production of the public
good should increase whenever the aggregate marginal benefits to all consumers (not individual
consumers) exceeds the marginal cost of increasing production. In other words, production
should increase until MRS aoA + MRS aoB = MRTao . Stated slightly more generally, economic welfare
is maximized when:

 MRS

i
io

= MRTio

i

This is the familiar Samuelson condition widely recognized as the optimality condition that
distinguishes public from private goods.
In other words, each person’s consumption creates spillover benefits for other people.22
The problem is that each person will set their own consumption level based on their personal
benefit rather than the aggregate social benefits. This will lead them to limit their consumption
even when further increases would cause aggregate marginal social benefits from investing more
resources in the public good would exceed the marginal cost of doing so. In other words,
individuals will consume where their marginal rates of substitution equal –Pa /Po, even though
efficiency requires that the sum of every consumers’ marginal rate of substitution equals this
price ratio.23 As a result, each individual sets their consumption level too low, and the market

22
23

CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 10, at 27–28.
Id. at 27.
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necessarily reaches equilibrium at a point inside the horizon of the production possibilities
frontier.
The dynamics are depicted in the modified Edgeworth Box in Figure 5. The amount of
the public good i represented on the horizontal axis. The amount of the private good a
represented on the vertical axis, with the amount consumed by Alison measured upward (aA) and
the amount consumed by Brendan measured downward (aB). The length of the vertical axis
(0A0B) represents the total quantity of a that can be produced (and thus consumed), although this
can be adjusted upwards or downwards if more resources are allocated to the production of a. In
the absence of any consumption by the other person, Alison would consume i0A , and Brendan
would consume i0B .
Figure 5: Consumption in an Economy of Public Goods
B

0

݅

݅ଵ

i

B

a

݅ଵ

aA
݅

A

0

i

݅ ݅ଵ

Source: CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 19, at 27 fig.2.2.
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Because the public good is simultaneously consumed by both people, Alison
automatically receives the i0B funded and consumed by Brendan, which effectively shifts her
budget line outwards by that amount. The additional resources permits Alison to reach an
indifference curve located farther from the origin, at which point she voluntary consumes a
quantity of i1A . Brendan in turn automatically receives the i1A funded and consumed by Alison,
which causes him to increase his consumption to i1B . It is an easy matter to calculate both
Alison’s and Brendan’s best response function for any quantity consumed by the other person.
The intersection between these two curves represents a Nash equilibrium.
Figure 6: Nash Reaction Paths for Public Goods

iA
Nash reaction path for B

Nash reaction path for A

iB
Source: CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 19, at 28 fig.2.3.
Although the fact that each individual bases their consumption decision on their personal
marginal rate of substitution (and thus stops short of the welfare maximizing point which is
determined by the sum of every individuals’ marginal rate of substitution), it is still individually
rational for each person to contribute something to the production of the public good. For this
reason, the literature refers to the tendency toward underproduction as “easy riding” rather than

14

“free riding.”24 Empirical studies have has confirmed that individuals will make positive, but
suboptimal contributions to producing a public good.25 For the reasons stated above, this
equilibrium will necessarily fall below the welfare-maximizing ideal.
B.

Demand-Side Price Discrimination as a Necessary Condition for Efficient Market
Provision
The Samuelson condition implies that if public goods are to be privately provided, the

producer must recover the aggregate marginal benefits accrued by every consumer. Because
marginal benefits are likely to differ person to person, this implies that every person should be
charged a different price based on the incremental value they place on investing more resources
in producing the public good. As noted above, because every consumer receives the entire
industry output, individualized priding is the only available instrument for signaling the intensity
of preferences and for funding the production of the public good.
Public good economics thus provides an efficiency-based justification for allowing
FRAND licensing fees to vary depending on the incremental value that the licensees place on the
patented invention.26 Indeed, the Samuelson condition indicates that such value-based
discrimination is a necessary condition for efficient market provision. It also underscores the
importance of permitting only those pricing differentials that are based on demand characteristics
and not those based on any market power created by the standard setting process.

For examples, see id. at 30; Richard Cornes & Todd Sandler, Easy Riders, Joint Production, and Public
Goods, 94 ECON. J. 580, 580 n.2 (1984).
25
For reviews of the literature, see DOUGLAS D. DAVIS & CHARLES A. HOLT, EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS
317–75 (1993); John O. Ledyard, Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research, in HANDBOOK OF
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 111, 122–169 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995).
26
Carlton & Shampine, supra note 6, at 546–47.
24
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C.

Expansion of the Range Over Which Price Discrimination Is Relevant
The conventional wisdom under the marginal-cost approach to nonrivalry is that price

discrimination is only relevant with respect to those inefficiently excluded from the market, i.e.,
the quantity represented by the deadweight loss triangle. Price discrimination with respect to
inframarginal consumers simply transfers surplus from consumers to producers.
The Samuelson condition suggests a broader scope for price discrimination. Economic
efficiency requires charging every consumer the marginal benefit they would derive from
investing more resources in the public good (although as we shall see in the next section, the
potential for inframarginal transfers may allow some restriction in the range of quantities over
which price discrimination is necessary.
D.

The Retention of Consumer Surplus
Perfect price discrimination is often criticized for transferring the entire surplus to

consumers. Although this maximizes total welfare, it reduces consumer welfare. Indeed,
although price discrimination can be efficient, it can increase patent holders’ ability to extract
surplus (including those associated with the standard rather than the underlying technology).27
The Samuelson condition makes clear that market efficiency does not require that
producers capture the entire surplus enjoyed by consumers. Instead, it underscores that
producers need only appropriate the aggregate marginal benefits enjoyed by consumers.
Consumers may retain any inframarginal benefits without preventing the public good from being
privately provided.

27

Id. at 549.

16

The approach to FRAND royalty rates implied by public good economics is consistent
with this insight by its requirement that the FRAND license reflect only the licensee’s
incremental profits, not its full profits.28 Not only does this satisfy their bargaining-oriented
benchmark of leaving the parties in the same position in which they would have been without the
standard; it also has the benefit of satisfying the Samuelson condition for economic efficiency.29
At the same time, it ensures that licensees retain some of the surplus and thus benefit from the
innovation.
III.

COMPLICATIONS AND POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES

Public good economics thus provides an analytical framework for showing that
permitting patentholders to charge different prices to different classes of customers would not
only allocate surplus in accordance with the ex ante bargaining power that the parties would have
exercised in the absence of the standard. It would also satisfy the conditions for the optimal
private production of public goods.
At the same time, public good economics identifies potential institutional obstacles for
determining whether FRAND licenses reflect value to the licensee. At the same time, it suggests
one way that the standard-setting process might mitigate those problems.
A.

Strategic Avoidance of Funding Sunk Costs
The combination of nonrivalry and the fact that consumers retain some amount of the

surplus creates incentives for holdup. Considering first nonrivalry, the fact that every consumer

Id. at 536.
The producer of the public good need not necessarily appropriate the exact marginal benefit from each
consumer. As a theoretical matter, the producer could capture inframarginal surplus from some consumers and
appropriate less than the full marginal benefit from others. All that the producer cares about is whether its aggregate
return equals the sum of every consumer’s marginal benefit.

28
29
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enjoys the benefits of the entire industry output means that consumers benefit from further
investments in the public good even when they did not pay for those further investments. This
creates the incentive for each consumer to try to induce other consumers into contributing more
to the creation of the public good.
If the patentholder were already appropriating all of the available surplus, such a strategy
would prove ineffectual, as other consumers would have no surplus they could contribute to
financing the public good. The fact that consumers need only contribute the marginal benefits
they receive from further investments in the public good and can retain any inframarginal surplus
provides incentives for an individual consumer to attempt to induce others to use part of their
inframarginal surplus to finance creation of the public good. In essence, consumers have the
incentive and the ability to act strategically to induce others to invest part of their surplus that
they otherwise would have retained in the public good. If these attempts are unsuccessful, they
can exacerbate the systematic underproduction of the public good.
B.

Incentive Incompatibility
Another salient problem associated with the private provision of public goods is incentive

incompatibility. Because optimality requires that every person consume the same quantity and
pay a different price that reflects the benefit they derive from any marginal increases in the
amount invested in the public good, idealized public good pricing imposes the same
informational requirements associated with any system of perfect price discrimination. In the
context of consumer goods, moreover, valuations are completely subjective. Because valuation
information is private, individual consumers have both the incentive and the ability to
misrepresent their valuation of the public good in an attempt to induce other consumers to bear a
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larger percentage of the costs.30 If the patentholder was already appropriating all of the available
surplus, such a strategy would prove ineffectual, as other consumers would have no surplus they
could contribute to financing the public good. The fact that consumers retain some degree of
surplus provides incentives for an individual consumer to attempt to induce others to use part of
their inframarginal surplus to finance creation of the public good.
Various scholars have proposed using mechanism design to induce consumers to reveal
their true valuations.31 Perhaps the best known example of mechanism design is the Vickrey
auction.32 Vickrey recognized that participants in auctions in which winners are required to pay
the full amount of their final bids have an incentive submit bids that are less than their full
valuation. This is because the winner may not have to pay their full valuation if the valuation of
the second-highest bidder is considerably lower. The desire to reduce the amount one would
have to pay inevitably leads bidders to submit bids that are less than their full valuation even if
doing so reduces their chances to win the auction.33
Vickrey auctions solve this problem by creating mechanism in which the size of the bid
affects the likelihood of winning the auction, but does not affect the amount the winner will
actually pay. Under this mechanism, the highest bidder wins the auction, but only has to pay the
amount of the second highest bid.34 Making the amount that winners pay independent of the
valuations they report and instead dependent on the valuations that others report eliminates the
disincentive to report valuations accurately. In game theoretic terms, this makes reporting one’s
preferences accurately the dominant strategy. As a result, participants in an auction can bid their
Samuelson, Public Expenditure, supra note supra note 16, at 336; Samuelson, Diagrammatic Exposition,
supra note 21, at 355; Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387, 388
(1954).
31
See CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 10, at 214–21; Jean-Jacques Laffont, Incentives and the Allocation of
Public Goods, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, supra note 10, at 537, 554–59.
32
William Vickrey, Counterspeculation, Auctions and Competitive Sealed Tenders, 16 J. FIN. 8 (1961).
33
Id. at 14–15.
34
Id. at 8, 20–21.
30
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full valuation without having to worry that they would have to pay more than the minimum
necessary to win the auction.35
Edward Clarke and Theodore Groves adapted Vickrey’s approach into a mechanism for
valuing public goods.36 The would-producer of the public good invites citizens to submit their
full valuations of the public good. The would-be producer then examines whether the
cumulative valuations satisfy the Samuelson condition and thus would be socially beneficial.
However, each citizen would not pay their full valuation. Instead, they would pay a tax equal to
the difference between the total cost of the public good and the sum of all of the other citizens’
valuations. The fact that the reported valuation does not directly affect the amount that any
citizen has to pay eliminates the incentive for citizens to understate their true valuations.37
This mechanism is subject to a number of limitations. As an initial matter, the
mechanism presumes that all of the potential beneficiaries of the public good can be identified
and addressed at one time. It also requires a third party who can be trusted to implement the
mechanism faithfully, and the mechanism must not be subject to renegotiation after the
preferences are revealed. In addition, this mechanism functions only if preferences are single
peaked.38
Most importantly, the model assumes that each individual’s valuation is independent of
their income and that the money paid does not provide any incremental benefits.39 Moreover,
allowing the revenue raised by the auction to inure to the benefit of the bidders would destroy the
independence between the amounts bid and the amount paid that is the key to maintaining
CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 10, at 115.
Edward H. Clarke, Multipart Pricing of Public Goods, 11 PUB. CHOICE 19 (1971); Theodore Groves &
Martin Loeb, Incentives and Public Inputs, 4 J. PUB. ECON. 211 (1975).
37
CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 10, at 223–24.
38
Laffont, supra note 31, at 550. Further worked has applied the framework to a broader set of preferences,
although restrictive assumptions still apply. Theodore C. Bergstrom & Richard C. Cornes, Independence of
Allocative Efficiency form Distribution in the Theory of Public Goods, 51 ECONOMETRICA 1753 (1983).
39
CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 10, at 227.
35
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incentive compatibility. This means that the contributions to the production of the public good
that exceed the cost of producing it must not be returned to the citizens. Otherwise the amounts
bid would have an impact on the amounts paid and would destroy the decoupling of these two
considerations that preserves the incentive to reveal valuations truthfully.40 Later work created
mechanisms that eliminate the surplus that must be “wasted,” but that mechanism incorporates
the weaker equilibrium concept of Nash equilibrium, that is, that people have the incentive to
report their preferences truthfully if everyone else is doing so.41 It also requires that information
about every actor’s payoff structure be public, and the fact that these valuations are not public is
what led to the incentive incompatibility problem in the first place.42
The theoretical literature on public goods has thus not come up with a complete solution
to the incentive compatibility problem. One potential saving grace in the context of FRAND is
that the relevant valuations are for commercial projects, not personal consumption. As a result,
the presence of downstream retail markets may provide a more tractable basis for determining
valuations. If the FRAND license is a major determinant of the downstream price, any attempt at
valuation would be inherently circular, in that the size of the licensing fee would depend on the
downstream price, while the downstream price would depend primarily on the size of the
licensing fee. Such circularity would not be determinative, however, if the patent must be
combined with other inputs and represents only a small percentage of the overall cost of the
finished good.

Id. at 121, 228.
Theodore Groves & John O. Ledyard, Some Limitations to Demand Revealing Processes, 29 PUB. CHOICE
107 (1977).
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C.

Standards as Bundling
There is one sense in which incorporating a patent into a standard may make it easier to

engage in price discrimination.43 As George Stigler noted in his seminal analysis of block
booking,44 bundling the patent with other inputs whose demands are inversely correlated makes
it easier to extract surplus with a simple, one-part price.45 To use a modified form of Stigler’s
example, assume that a firm is offering two products to two buyers with the prices are noted in
Figure 5. If the producer sells the products separately, it will maximize profits by pricing
Product 1 at $7 (achieving two sales) and pricing Product 2 at $2.50 (achieving two sales) for a
total revenue of $19. If the producer instead sells products as a bundle, it can charge $10. Since
both customers value both products at $10 or more, the producer can increase its revenue to $20.
The key is that the buyers’ demands for the products are negatively correlated. Part of Buyer A’s
surplus for Product 1 helps fund Product 2, and part of Buyer B’s surplus for Product 2 helps
fund Product 1. With private goods, it is possible that bundling can create welfare loss by
inducing customers to purchase goods even when their reservation price falls below the marginal
cost of producing another unit of that good.46 Fortunately for our purposes, such a concern is
irrelevant for information goods for which marginal cost is effectively zero.47
Figure 5: Bundling of Two Products with Negatively Correlated Demands
Buyer A

Buyer B

For an earlier discussion of bundling, see Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking the Commitment to Free, Local
Television, 52 EMORY L.J. 1579, 1706–09 (2003).
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Product 1

$8,000

$7,000

Product 2

$2,500

$3,000

Source: George J. Stigler, United States v. Loew’s Inc.: A Note on BlockBooking, 1963 SUP. CT. REV. 152, 153.
Subsequent work has shown that bundling facilitates the extraction of surplus any time
the buyers’ demands for the bundle components are independently correlated.48 As Figure 6
indicates, the variance narrows and demand flattens still further as the number of products added
to the bundle increases.
Figure 6: Bundling of Goods with Independently Correlated Demands

Source: Bakos & Brynjolfsson, supra note 47, at 1617 fig.1.
Reducing the heterogeneity of customers’ preferences flattens the aggregate demand
curve, which makes it easier to extract surplus through simple one-part pricing.49 As such, the
informational requirements for this form of price discrimination are much simpler.
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CONCLUSION
The connection between patents and intellectual property has long been accepted, but to
date, the literature has done little to explore the connection. A close analysis of public goods
theory reveals a number of insights that can help inform courts and policymakers charged with
addressing standard essential patents and interpreting FRAND requirements.
The dominant approach to standard essential patents reflected in the academic literature
takes the existing distribution of entitlements as given and simply tries to set FRAND royalties to
mimic what would have been the outcome of bilateral negotiations had the standard not been
created. Public good economics provides a standard for determining the welfare-maximizing
outcome that does not simply try to replicate the status quo.
In addition, public good economics reveals that demand-side price discrimination is a
necessary condition for efficient market provision. In the process, it shows that such price
discrimination must occur over the entire range of production, but allows consumers to retain
some of the resulting surplus.
The literature also points out that incentive incompatibility remains a central problem and
identifies some alternative institutional solutions that might provide a starting point for the
search for mechanisms that are incentive incompatible. In all of these ways, a more complete
appreciation of the relevance of public good economics can help shape patent policy in important
and constructive ways.
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